Towards comparative conclusions on the role of sharia in national law by Otto, J.M.
14 Towards comparativeconclusions on the role of
sharia in national law
Table of contents
14.1 Introduction 615
Preliminary analysis 615
Different uses of the term sharia 615
The essentialist trap 616
‘Structural death’ or ‘incorporation’ of sharia? 617
Not an overview of human rights violations 618
Structure of the chapter 619
14.2 Understanding the present by the past 619
1985 up to the present: taking stock of recent developments 620
1965 to 1985: the rise, flowering and effect of the Islamic
revival in law 621
1920 to 1965: decolonisation, developmental ambitions of
new states, and their limits 622
1800 to 1920: European expansion, modernisation, colonial
pluralism, and the rise of nationalism 623
Back to the present 625
14.3 Concerns and issues, preliminary findings 626
Supremacy of sharia 627
Legal status of women 631
Cruel corporal punishments 632
Violations of human rights 634
14.4 Comparing and ordering national legal systems 635
Puritan orientation towards classical sharia 636
Large middle group 637
Secular system 643
14.5 Governance 644
Sharia policy in the broader context of governance 644
State, puritans and politics: the clashes within… 645
The complex relationship between sharia and custom 647
Attitudes of the West 649
The long and winding road to justice 650
Notes 652
Bibliography 653
14.1 Introduction
Preliminary analysis
This chapter draws some preliminary conclusions from the country stu-
dies. It does not yet attempt to present a comprehensive analysis of all
issues addressed in the country studies. More extensive work is needed
to expose and analyse the rich harvest of these studies. A publication in-
cluding full comparative analysis is planned for the near future.
Different uses of the term sharia
Many people assume and propagate that sharia is a uniform thing, a
fixed, unchangeable set of norms that is binding upon all Muslims. On
the other hand, we can all see a diversity of schools and interpretations
of Islam. In section 1.2 it was suggested that this contradiction stems
from conflating the different ways in which the term ‘sharia’ is used.
The twelve country studies have illustrated the co-existence of these dif-
ferent uses of the term sharia beyond any reasonable doubt. Whereas
sharia in Saudi Arabia equals a set of puritan interpretations, which
have kept the legal status of women quite similar to the times when its
rules were developed by the classical scholar al-Hanbali, in Egypt,
Morocco or Indonesia sharia manifests itself quite differently, for exam-
ple in moderate, contemporary interpretations which provide for a bet-
ter legal position of women in marriage law.
The chapters provide abundant historical evidence of shifts in the in-
terpretation of sharia as well as of a great variety in orientations both
among and within national legal systems. To pick just one example, we
trace Iran one century back, when it witnessed a movement that culmi-
nated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.
Mirza Mohammad Hossein Na‘ini (1860-1936), the most high-
ranking cleric to support the movement, provided for instance
religious arguments for the rejection of absolutism and a de-
fence of constitutionalism. In contrast, the main clerical oppo-
nent of the constitution, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, argued that
ideas of democracy and freedom, the reforms advocated by the
constitutionalists, and the establishment of a parliament to enact
legislation, were in contradiction with Islam. (Mir-Hosseini in-
tra, see 8.1)
The common assumption that sharia is binding, i.e. that Muslims are
exclusively subject to classical sharia, is also based on misconceptions.
This book illustrates that since the early Islamic states of the eighth and
ninth centuries sharia always existed alongside of other normative
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systems which could be as binding as or even more binding than parti-
cular versions of sharia. Whilst religious scholars have always argued
that God’s divine law is binding upon believers, in practice the applica-
tion of the doctrine has often been made subordinate to other norms,
for example to the state’s definition of the public interest, or to local
custom. This is also the case in states that are supposed to have ‘com-
pletely’ islamised their laws, like the Sudan.
At present, the Sudan possesses a legal system that is charac-
terised by a high degree of legal pluralism. The heritage of the
common law is, despite the ups and downs of twenty years of
Islamisation efforts, still clearly visible in two important aspects:
first of all, certain laws of the time of the condominium are still
valid, and, secondly, more recent legislation can be traced back
to the condominium in terms of organisation and wording.
Most significantly, despite efforts of the Bashir government to
marginalise it, customary law is still of major importance in the
rural areas of the Sudan. It is estimated that as much as 80 per
cent of all cases in the Sudan are judged in accordance with cus-
tomary law. (Ko¨ndgen intra, see 5.10)
The essentialist trap
Misconceptions about the ‘unchangeable’ and ‘binding’ nature of sharia
are not just isolated opinions. They are indispensable building bricks of
an essentialist perspective, which conceptualises ‘the sharia’, ‘the
Islamic law’, ‘the Islam’, the Muslim people’, ‘the Muslims’ as fixed
and delineated entities. In this perspective, particular provisions in
authoritative texts are held to represent the essence of a whole Islamic
civilisation, an Islamic culture, and a living Islamic legal system. Such
essentialism is, in the first place, the trademark of puritans in the
Muslim world. In addition, it provides the main rationale for
Islamophobia in the West. The simple reduction of the values and
norms of millions of people to a few daunting notions, is a familiar tool
in the discourse of ethnic politics. Clearly, essentialists are not im-
pressed by the fact that such reduction often leads to generalised as-
sumptions – for example, ‘women do not work under Islam’ as Ibn
Warraq put it in Why I am not a Muslim – which are in stark contrast
with transparent social realities.
The puritan discourse of how sharia has been incorporated in na-
tional law, is equally essentialist: the incorporation has been all wrong,
corrupt and Western, and only complete replacement with ‘true sharia’
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can bring salvation. As explained in section 1.5, this is only one of sev-
eral ways to look at the incorporation of sharia.
‘Structural death’ or ‘incorporation’ of sharia?
A different view of incorporation holds that the sharia’s actual struc-
tures of authority – including the jurisconsult (mufti), the judge (qadi),
and the law professor (sheykh) – and the discursive and cultural prac-
tices that had always existed within the sharia, met their ‘structural
death in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ (Hallaq 2009: 15-
16). For those who have been worried about the recent expansion of
sharia, it is perhaps surprising to learn from a leading academic scholar
in this field that sharia, as an organic system, is no more; in his pre-
vious work Hallaq (2003) found this an understandable reason for
‘Muslim rage’. His analysis is shared by Feldman who writes about the
sharia: ’Most devastating, the one institution that historically played a
central role in establishing and maintaining the rule of law in Islamic
states has been destroyed’ (Feldman 2008: 126). He deplores this big
role reversal, which transferred final authority in legal matters to the
state, calling it plainly a ‘disaster’ (ibid: 7).
The country studies in this book confirm that most Muslim states –
with the exception perhaps of Saudi Arabia – have indeed replaced
those age-old structures and practices with new legal institutions which
are shaping and reshaping the legal rules of the present. Indeed we
could conclude with Cammack that ‘[T]he acquisition by the modern
state of a virtual monopoly over law-making presents the Islamic legal
tradition with one of its most basic challenges’ (Cammack 2005: 190).
At the same time, the vast majority of contemporary Muslim-majority
states, confronted with the imposing heritage of sharia, decided to pre-
serve important elements. They probably realised that this also is what
most of their citizens prefer and expect. In Who speaks for Islam,
Esposito and Mogahed (2007) confirm on the basis of large-scale opi-
nion polls, that there is widespread support ‘for sharia in the Muslim
world’ (Esposito & Mogahed 2007: 35). However, the desired sharia
seems not to be of the classical and static type, and does not fully de-
pend on the old structures of authority. For according to Esposito and
Mogahed, the Gallup data demonstrate that clear majorities of respon-
dents throughout the Muslim world find that women should have the
same legal rights as men (ibid: 51). Generally, the support for democ-
racy and human rights is also significant (ibid: 47). Muslims seem to
entrust key decisions in law and governance to the ‘new’ legal institu-
tions of the state, rather than to the old structures of sharia authority:
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Significant majorities in many countries say religious leaders
should play no direct role in drafting a country’s constitution,
writing national legislation, drafting new laws, determining for-
eign policy and international relations, or deciding how women
dress in public or what is televised or published in newspapers.
Others who opt for a direct role tend to stipulate that religious
leaders should only serve in advisory capacity to government of-
ficials. (Esposito and Mogahed 2007: 50)
In section 14.5 we will further explore how governments, in matters of
incorporation of sharia, are often forced to steer a middle course be-
tween the main opposing forces and their discourses, namely puritans,
religious scholars, tribal and community leaders, and human rights
critics at home and abroad. Struggles and negotiations are conducted in
several governance arenas, of which the ‘new’ legal institutions, govern-
ment, parliament, judiciary, and, last but not least, the bureaucracy, play
crucially important roles. It remains here to say that the preservation of
important elements of sharia, whether in the puritan or moderate form,
continues to be a factor which cannot be ignored in any discussion of
legal systems in most Muslim countries.
Not an overview of human rights violations
The country studies in this book sadly confirm the well-known fact that
in most developing countries violations of human rights occur fre-
quently and systematically. Up-to-date information on such violations is
available from websites and reports of monitoring committees of inter-
national human rights treaties, of governments and non-governmental
organisations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or
Freedom House. However, unlike many assume, violations in Muslim
countries often have little to do with sharia. Abiad (2008: 173-175) even
concludes on the basis of another comparative research of Muslim
countries, that ‘it is not Sharia which is preventing the implementation
of human rights’, but a ‘lack of political will’ of the governments (ibid:
173). In contrast, Abiad argues, ‘the very nature of Sharia demonstrates
the potential of reform in the interest of human rights’ (ibid: 173).
Our study finds that a number of violations is directly related to
norms and practices based in Islamic legal traditions. The fact that si-
milar violations elsewhere may be based on Christian, Hindu, Buddhist
or other convictions and ideologies, does not diminish that relation. In
many cases, such human rights violations are condoned by the state,
and in certain cases they are even officially justified by sharia-based
state law.
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Although this book does not systematically list human rights viola-
tions, as there is no need to reiterate the existing reports, the authors’
chapters are thoroughly informed, if not motivated by the said con-
cerns. In our probing of national law, we have, often implicitly, explored
and assessed the human rights protection systems available in the re-
spective countries. It is in view of the sharia-related violations of human
rights that this study has defined four areas of main concern (see 1.3).
Discrimination of women, freedom of religion (apostasy), and cruel cor-
poral punishments are among the concerns investigated. Other impor-
tant concerns, for example the legal position of non-Muslims and non-
orthodox Muslims, of atheists, and of homosexuals, could not be in-
cluded in this study.
Structure of the chapter
Following these words of introduction, the second section (see 14.2) will
summarise historical changes in the relationship between sharia and
national law. The section will start with developments in most recent
decades, and then unfold the trends and changes which took place in
relevant historical periods, going back in time. In section 14.3 we will
consider the law presently in force in the twelve countries under review
and draw preliminary comparative conclusions about the four concerns
identified in the introduction, i.e. the supremacy of sharia; the legal sta-
tus of women; degrading corporal punishments; and the compatibility
of sharia with human rights. The next section (see 14.4) will compare
the twelve countries under review in respect of the degree to which
sharia-based rules, especially those of a puritan orientation, have actu-
ally been incorporated in their respective legal systems. The final sec-
tion 14.5 will look at the incorporation of sharia as a problem of govern-
ance. It will consider several aspects of governance: how has the state
been incorporating sharia amidst many other concerns with develop-
ment and governance; the pressure of puritan politics and the religious
establishment of scholars; customary law and its complex relationship
with sharia; attitudes of the West; and, in conclusion, it will look at the
conditions under which the relation between sharia and national law
may further develop on the long and winding road to justice.
14.2 Understanding the present by the past
The twelve country chapters in this book examine historical changes
and trends in the relationship between sharia and national law. For the
purpose of comparison they use a common periodisation. Section 1.6
explains why the years 1800, 1920, 1965 and 1985 were selected as
turning points.
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1985 up to the present: taking stock of recent developments
One of the most striking findings of this study is that the first wave of
stringent islamisation of law, which took place between 1972 and 1985
in no less than four countries, was not followed by a similar second
wave. As the country studies demonstrate, since the mid 1980s core
countries of the Islamic revolution such as Iran, Pakistan, the Sudan –
as well as Libya – have shown second thoughts about some of their
early legal reforms. Actually, most of the countries under review have
shown a sense of moderation, by either rolling back on some of the ear-
lier reforms (Iran), or moving – slowly or rapidly – towards constitution-
alism (Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Afghanistan, Turkey), continuing liber-
alisation of marriage laws (Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan), restraint in the
execution of cruel corporal punishments (Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria),
significant progress in democracy and human rights (Indonesia), or just
maintaining the status quo (Mali). Their record in ratification of human
right treaties confirms this trend (see 14.3).
In Afghanistan, the puritan Taliban regime was replaced with a con-
stitutional regime, though by military force. In Indonesia, after
Suharto’s fall in 1998 a regime emerged, which was much more de-
voted to the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Liberal reforms
of marriage law were notably carried through by innovative legislation
in Egypt (2000) and Morocco (2004), by amendments of the civil code
of Iran (see 8.6), and by case law in Pakistan (see 9.6). The expansion
of sharia criminal law in particular, which had caught worldwide atten-
tion in 1979 (Pakistan) and in 1983-1984 (the Sudan), lost much of its
practical application. This became clear also in North Nigeria, where
sharia criminal law had been introduced only in 2000/2001. In Iran
the orthodox fervor of the revolution and its massive support base have
declined over the last decade; even the conservative Council of
Guardians had to tolerate a more pragmatic body above it. Saudi-Arabia
announced a major judicial reform in 2008 and appointed its first fe-
male cabinet minister in 2009.
Despite this evidence of moderation, there were also some signs of
reverse trends. The most evident examples include: the introduction of
retribution punishments in Pakistan (1997); the rolling back of mar-
riage law reform in Malaysia (1994); the abovementioned introduction
of sharia criminal law in Northern Nigeria (2000) and in other sub-na-
tional entities, including Indonesia’s remote province of Aceh. In Iran,
as Mir Hosseini describes (see 8.6), at the time of writing parliament is
revising a conservative draft Family Protection Law, which women’s
rights defenders have chosen to call an ‘Anti-Family Bill’, and a bill
making apostasy a criminal offence.
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On balance, however, trends of moderation and gradual liberalisation
seem to outweigh the trends in opposite direction. This conclusion goes
against the publications of influential academics such as Huntington
and Lewis, and strongly suggests that the alarmist report published by
Freedom House in 2005 stating that the world in the last 25 years has
witnessed the rapid replacement of liberal Western law by extreme sha-
ria, is at best incorrect (Marshall 2005).
1965 to 1985: the rise, flowering and effect of the Islamic revival in law
The remarkable Islamic ‘Revolutions’ of Iran and Pakistan (1979), and
the Sudan (1983) were the result of both domestic as well as interna-
tional processes. Development policies had been rather unsuccessful in
those countries. The centralised, authoritarian, mostly socialist, ideology
of the 1960s was showing cracks, and so were the reputations of ruling
political elites. Governments and politicians felt a strong pressure from
traditional elites, such as religious scholars and tribal chiefs, and had to
respond, even if only for tactical reasons. During this period religious
scholars and puritans made their voices better heard throughout the
Muslim world, and in Iran under Khomeini the clergy even seized
power.
The international impact was tremendous, especially in the Muslim
world. Islamists everywhere were encouraged to gear up their opposi-
tion against governments. Their puritan ideology featured three ele-
ments: a broad and bitter critique of the government in power; an out-
spoken dislike of the West because of its political, military, and econom-
ic dominance and of what is seen as its moral decadence; and a
competing governance model, i.e. the ‘Islamic state’, which should ‘in-
troduce the sharia’ and replace ‘Western law’. General Zia-ul-Haq, who
seized power in Pakistan in 1979 and General Numeiri, who had long
been in power in the Sudan, both sensed the legitimising effects of this
ideology, and decreed islamisation of law.
Because Islam in most Muslim countries is Sunni, whereas Islam in
Iran is Shii, most puritan movements were more open to Sunni mis-
sionary movements. These were often sponsored by Saudi Arabia, while
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood served as a model for political pro-
grammes and organisational methods. The aversion of the Brotherhood
and similar movements to the West dated back to the times of its
founding in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna; only a while ago most Muslim
countries had been under European colonial rule. After struggling for
independence they were liberated from foreign rule, and yet many felt
that Western domination had still not disappeared.
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1920 to 1965: decolonisation, developmental ambitions of new states, and
their limits
In this period colonial rule came to an end, with a first wave of inde-
pendence of Muslim countries in the 1920s, and a second after 1945.
Modernisation, or ‘development’ as it came to be called after 1950, be-
came a declared goal for almost all new governments. Reforms in the
Muslim world were sometimes quite radical.
[I]n 1920 […] the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Turkish
Republic rose from its ashes. The founder of the Republic,
Kemal Atatu¨rk, tolerated the continued existence of Islamic law
in the Republic for only a very short period of time. Especially
during the period 1924-1929, a number of voluntary receptions
of codes of law from Western countries gave Turkey its civilian,
secular character. The Constitution of 1924 confirmed the prin-
ciple of laicism as a key foundational principle of the Republic.
After the 1930s, the influence of the shari’a on national law eva-
porated. (Koc¸ak intra, see 6.10)
Inspired by the Turkish example, strong modernist rulers, such as Reza
Shah in Iran and King Amanullah in Afghanistan, also distanced them-
selves from the religious establishment and classical sharia in order to
create strong nation-states with modern legal systems. In Egypt, the
first post-independence cabinets opted for more gradual modernisation.
The same goes for Morocco, which had become a French Protectorate
in 1912. In the Arab paeninsula King Abd al-Aziz was building the na-
tion-state of Saudi Arabia, having just united, as Van Eijk puts it ‘the
cosmopolitan Hijaz’ in the West ‘with his own conservative Wahhabist
followers in the Najd’ (see 4.2).
From the 1950s onwards, almost all newly independent states em-
braced the ideology of development, cherishing the twin goals of na-
tion-building and socio-economic progress. Consequently, countries
such as Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Sudan, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco,
and Nigeria, also set out to build for themselves a modern national legal
system, as an instrument for social transformation. Especially after
World War II, socialism, with its atheistic standpoint, exerted much in-
fluence in developing countries. ‘Arab Socialism’, emphasising equality
– also between men and women – became a dominant ideology in the
Middle East under the leadership of Egypt’s President Nasser. Under
the new nationalist but authoritarian regimes, the displacement, natio-
nalisation and reform of sharia, which had started in the nineteenth
century (see below), were accelerated. Nasser, for example, closed the
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religious family courts in 1955, placing jurisdiction for marital and in-
heritance cases under the umbrella of a unified, national judiciary.
[…] the Nasser government saw the existence of the separate fa-
mily courts as a legacy of Ottoman colonisation […]. (Berger and
Sonneveld intra, see 2.2)
The religious scholars who had once been the leading authorities of
sharia, found themselves in a third-rank position; tribal and community
leaders, who had been in charge of customary law for so long, were also
marginalised.
However, by the mid-1960s it appeared that many states had
achieved less security and socio-economic development than they had
hoped for and promised. The fact that leading politicians, civil servants
and army officers used their public positions for private gain, began to
create widespread resentment. Also, government’s attempts to unify
and modernise sensitive areas of law, such as family law and property
law, bringing them in accordance with rule-of-law standards, caused
considerable resistance (Allott 1980). Ethnic conflicts, separatist move-
ments, military coups and other conflicts threatened the stability of
many young states.
Although modern legislation existed on paper, its implementation
and enforcement proved disappointing. As the people expressed dissa-
tisfaction with their governments, traditional leaders saw opportunities
to regain lost powers. Many people loosing faith in the state resorted to
the mosque and the imam, even if only for Friday prayers, for mar-
riages, burials, and rituals. Prominent religious scholars, like the
Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini, bided their time in seminaries. Perhaps
the time was ripe for a successful counter-movement against the
changes that had begun to overtake the Muslim world more than 150
years earlier.
1800 to 1920: European expansion, modernisation, colonial pluralism, and
the rise of nationalism
When Napoleon and his famous mission arrived in Egypt in 1798, sha-
ria had been the prevailing legal system for more than thousand years
(see 1.6). The Ottoman Empire had carried on this tradition throughout
the Middle East for centuries. But around 1800 processes of rapid mod-
ernisation were set in motion under the influence of European expan-
sion, and ‘[T]he whole complex edifice that supplied religious authority
in Islam started to crumble’ (Abou el-Fadl 2007: 35).
The introduction of European legal concepts took place in two ways.
In the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Persia it was a matter of deliberate
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efforts by local elites and voluntary reception, whereas in Asia and
Africa the process occurred rather through colonial legislation and adju-
dication. Colonial expansion of European law occurred in the countries
under review which are today known as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan
as well as Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, and the Sudan. Indigenous rulers,
chiefs, and religious office-bearers were incorporated in colonial struc-
tures led by European non-Muslims, and thus moved to a secondary
position.
The advance of modern law also sealed the fate of classical sharia.
The Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman empire introduced large scale co-
dification in all important areas of law. Secular courts were introduced
to adjudicate cases on the basis of national law codes. Meanwhile mod-
ernist religious scholars like the polyglot al-Afghani and Muhammad
Abduh in Egypt – which was still under formal Ottoman authority –
proclaimed the reopening of the gate of free interpretation of sharia (ij-
tihad), and prepared for cautious codification and modernisation of
sharia-based marriage law.
Meanwhile, in the British, French and Dutch overseas territories, co-
lonial governments enacted a massive amount of new legislation, which
had nothing to do with sharia. New secular courts were established,
whilst sharia courts and other indigenous courts were regulated and re-
stricted. In areas, where European law overlapped with sharia or cus-
tomary law, new forms of mixing took place. In Britain’s colonies an en-
lightened ‘Anglo-Muhammedan’ law emerged through legislation and
case law. In Indonesia and other colonies, the government elevated ‘cus-
tomary law’ to serve as the law of the indigenous population, whereas
sharia was recognised only in so far as it was part of living customary
law. So, in different ways sharia law and institutions were restricted or
even pushed aside. A citation from the chapter on Nigeria gives a good
example of the advance of European law.
Public law, including Orders in Council of the Government of
Britain (in the case of Nigeria’s colonial constitutions) and some
of the enactments of the Governors-General, was of course
‘English’. The British also enacted various other laws specific to
Nigeria, including penal laws, and imported their statutes of
general application, their doctrines of equity, and their common
law. English law was applied in English courts staffed by British
judges, according to British rules of procedure and evidence. On
its private side, English law was originally intended for applica-
tion primarily to non-natives, and most by far of all cases com-
ing before Nigerian courts – upwards of 90 per cent, including,
for a long time, criminal cases – were handled in the Native
Courts according to native law and custom. The proviso was that
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no native law or custom should be enforced which was ‘repug-
nant to natural justice, equity and good conscience [as deter-
mined by the British] or incompatible either directly or by neces-
sary implication with any [English] law for the time being in
force’ (Keay & Richardson 1966: 233-238). Under this rule the
penalties imposed in the Native Courts, in particular, were
quickly brought under control. Mutilation – in the North
whether as hudud or as qisas – was abolished; death sentences
had to be carried out in a humane manner (Milner 1969: 263-
264). Various means were used to enforce the repugnancy rule,
including supervision of the Native Courts by British adminis-
trative authorities and finally, in 1933, rights of appeal from the
Native to the English courts. (Ostien intra, see 13.1)
A remarkable exception to these patterns of European legal expansion
was Saudi Arabia. No Western power had the ambition to conquer this
vast desert land, so that the power of the ruling Saudi tribes could re-
main connected with radical-puritanical Wahhabi doctrine, as it had
been since the eighteenth century. Under Wahhabi influence classical
sharia prevailed unimpaired as law.
Back to the present
It is safe to say that the main historical turning point in the relation be-
tween sharia and national law occurred as the state in the nineteenth
and twentieth century appropriated the leading part in legal develop-
ment, a role hitherto played by the religious scholars (ulama). As ex-
plained in the introduction, before 1800, in the Muslim world, a ruler’s
power to make laws was derived from the sharia-principle of siyasa,
which required that the laws remained within the limits of sharia (see
1.6). The authority to decide whether this was the case, rested, accord-
ing to sharia, with the scholars – a system which is often regarded as
the classical Islamic version of constitutional checks and balances
(Feldman 2008). This led to a situation in which legal systems in the
Muslim world consisted of two branches – scholars’ law and state law –
which could come together at the top in the Sultan-Caliph, and below
him in state-appointed qadis and muftis.
After the Ottoman reforms and the European colonial administration
of justice had prepared the ground for the take-over by the nation-state,
from 1920 onwards a growing number of independent Muslim states
began to introduce their own policies regarding incorporation. It was
not their main concern, though. The governance challenges for the
newly independent, developing, Muslim countries were daunting. From
the 1950s until the 1970s separatism, civil wars, and military coups
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were frequent. Despite the fact that many states succeeded in stabilising
society, and making progress in many areas (agriculture, industry, edu-
cation, public health), partly with the help of oil revenues, much went
wrong too.
There seems to be consensus on the idea that in that period most de-
veloping states suffered from major governance failures. Political elites
made policies for the common people without giving them a political
voice. Bureaucracies blocked and frustrated private entrepreneurship.
Individual rights were systematically subordinated to the public goods
of ‘stability’ and ‘development’. Politicians who now had the power to
manage vast public funds became self-serving, and corruption in-
creased. Most countries were unable to maintain effective courts, which
were to control illegal practices and provide remedies. And, finally,
there was a serious underestimation of people’s attachment to tradition
in the form of symbols, structures and authorities of religion and
custom.
In response to the above-mentioned governance failures a range of
domestic and transnational actors, began to promote democratisation,
privatisation, human rights, anti-corruption measures, and rule-of-law
policies, all with different motives. Also part of this counter-movement
were the ulama and their supporters, who called for religious and cul-
tural authenticity. The latter translated into the broad transnational
trend often indicated as the Islamic resurgence or awakening, or the ad-
vent of political Islam. While the diversity among islamist movements
was enormous, most of them shared the twin goals of introducing an
‘Islamic state’ as well as ‘the sharia’, instead of the pre-existing constitu-
tions and laws which were considered ‘bad’ and ‘Western’. The next
section discusses the effects of the efforts to islamise national law, since
Iran’s ‘Islamic revolution’ of 1979. How did the Muslim countries un-
der review deal with the various demands to radically change their con-
stitutional, family and criminal laws? And are the alarmist assumptions
about the islamisation of law, so common in the West, actually
justified?
14.3 Concerns and issues, preliminary findings
In the introduction I identified four widely shared concerns about isla-
misation of law, and divided them in concrete issues. This section will
consider what preliminary conclusions can be drawn about these con-
cerns and issues on the basis of our country studies.
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Supremacy of sharia
Scope
To which extent has sharia influenced the national legal systems as a
whole? Most country studies demonstrate clearly that most areas of law
have not been pervaded by sharia-based law. Saudi Arabia is the main
exception, followed at a distance by Iran, and then perhaps by the
Sudan. The majority of moderate governments strives to ensure that na-
tional law meets modern socio-economic needs. This has meant that in
many areas governments did not replicate classical sharia. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, Ayatollah Khomeini himself shared this view.
In order to facilitate legislation considered to be socially neces-
sary, even if it was in conflict with sharia, Khomeini gave a fatwa
in 1981 granting parliament the authority to proclaim such legis-
lation with absolute majority votes. Subsequently, the Guardian
Council ignored this fatwa and refused to approve much legisla-
tion promulgated on the basis of it. Khomeini responded in
1984 with another fatwa authorising parliament to create legisla-
tion based on the Islamic principles of social necessity (zarurat)
and expediency (maslahat) with a two-thirds majority.
(Mir-Hosseini intra, see 8.3)
Khomeini had written that the Leader’s mandate is absolute,
that he can even order the suspension of the primary rules of
Islam (for example regarding prayer or pilgrimage) if the inter-
ests of the Islamic state (maslahat-e nezam) demand it. Clearly,
when Khomeini had to choose between the sharia and the survi-
val of the state, he chose the latter (Arjomand 1992: 156-158).
(ibid, see 8.4)
In addition, it becomes clear that in eleven of the twelve countries the
impact of the colonial legal heritage of civil law and common law has
remained substantial (see Table 2 in 1.4). This does not apply only to
‘sharia-neutral’ areas of law – such as environmental law, labour law or
telecommunications law, where no influences of fiqh-texts are found –
but also to the politically ‘delicate’ areas where fiqh has traditionally
played an important role, such as family and inheritance law. Harding’s
observation about Malaysia that
The constitution and the institutions of the common law have
indeed provided the means whereby accommodation between
two fundamentally contradictory conceptions of legality has been
achieved. (Harding intra, see 11.10)
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could also apply to legislation and the rulings of supreme courts in
other common-law countries as well as in civil-law countries. In Egypt,
a civil law country, the scope of sharia, potentially widened by the 1980
amendment of Article 2 of the constitution, is in fact delineated by the
Supreme Constitutional Court, which
has laid down a few important ground rules: first, it is the only
court allowed to rule on (in)compatibility of Egyptian legislation
with the sharia; and, second, only legislation implemented after
1980 must conform to the principles of the sharia.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court holds a restrictive view of
what is encompassed by obligatory rules of sharia and, conse-
quently, accords the legislature a wide margin of legislative free-
dom. (Berger and Sonneveld intra, see 2.4)
Territory
To which extent has sharia-based law been enacted at sub-national le-
vels, notably in specific states, provinces or districts? In the 1990s
waves of democratic decentralisation led to the empowerment of sub-
national entities – states of a federation, provinces, districts, towns.
Some of them decided to enact sharia-related regulations, usually to
promote Islamic ‘virtue’ in religious and social behaviour. Certain states
in federations such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Nigeria, as well as pro-
vinces and districts in Indonesia issued regulations with criminal provi-
sions, prescribing dress codes for women and men, or compulsory les-
sons in religion. Some prohibited the consumption of food and drinks
during Ramadan, the consumption of alcohol, or ‘indecent behaviour’,
notably extramarital sex. On the latter, a much disputed regulation in
Aceh, Indonesia, even put a death penalty by stoning, in September
2009. In reality such regulations are not systematically enforced, in the
first place because it would be practically impossible to do so, and sec-
ondly because the legal basis of such regulations is often contested. As
national legal institutions are usually slow and reluctant to interfere in
such cases, issues are mollified, and legal uncertainty prevails.
Basic norm
To which extent have constitutions introduced sharia as the highest or
basic norm of legal systems? In five of the twelve countries, the consti-
tution holds provisions which establish an ‘Islamic state’ (see Table A.2
in Annexe). In seven of the twelve countries, constitutional articles de-
clare Islam to be the state religion (ibid). Six countries proclaim sharia
as ‘a source’ or even ‘the source’ of the national legal system or declare
that all legislation must be tested for its accordance with sharia (see
Table A.3 in Annexe).
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However, the suggestion of sharia supremacy created by such provi-
sions must be questioned, since at the same time, many provisions in
the same constitutions testify to supremacy of the constitution itself
and of the rule-of-law standards laid down therein. As a result, constitu-
tional laws in Muslim countries often seem to have a ‘dual basic norm’.
This gives the national legal systems of these countries an inherently
ambiguous character.
Legal decision makers
This issue is about who ultimately decides the rules in a legal system:
religious scholars or the office holders of the state? Iran provides us
with the only example of a national legal system where ultimate deci-
sions are the prerogative of a religious scholar, the Leader; other impor-
tant state offices in Iran must also be fulfilled by religious scholars,
such as six of the twelve seats of the Guardian Council which can veto
laws which parliament has approved, as well as the chief of the
Supreme Court. In Saudi Arabia religious scholars often enjoy a veto in
the legislative drafting process; especially the fatwas of the Council of
Senior Ulama and of influential government-employed ulama have ‘a
near legislative effect’ (see 4.5). Judicial office is accessible only to grad-
uates from the sharia colleges. Sharia legal opinions (fatwa) by juriscon-
sults (mufti) are important constitutive elements in the interpretation of
the law.
As to the other ten countries, most important decisions in the respec-
tive legal systems are made by office holders of the state instead of reli-
gious scholars.
Islamic codification
The issue here is twofold, the first whether the area, in which sharia is
most influential, i.e. family law, is regulated by uncodified sharia law or
by codified national law, and the second whether due to recent islamisa-
tion policies pre-existing law codes, based on Western models, were
thrown overboard and replaced by fully islamised codes.
According to Table 3 (see below) Islamic family law is codified into
national legislation in eight of the twelve countries; secular marriage
law is codified in three others namely Turkey, Mali and the Nigerian
federation. Uncodified sharia is applied in marital affairs only in Saudi
Arabia, and North Nigeria.
A full scale islamisation of existing law codes seems to have taken
place in two countries mainly, the Sudan and Iran, not in the others.
It must be noted that Saudi Arabia has made some important steps
to codify hitherto uncodified areas of law into national legislation,
namely its constitutional law in the Basic Ordinance of 1992, and its
criminal procedure law in the code of 2001.
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Islamic courts
Have states established separate Islamic judiciaries1 that have taken on
the functions of secular state courts? We noted that in four countries,
namely in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Sudan and North Nigeria, there are
broadening mandates and powers of separate ‘religious’ or ‘Islamic’
courts.2
Islamic ruler
Is the ‘Islamic ruler’ with his apparatus essentially authoritarian and
without a check on his power, i.e. does ‘oriental despotism’, to use
Wittfogel’s famous term, still prevail? Among the Muslim countries un-
der review, monarchs and dynasties are not common anymore. Of the
twelve countries, ten are republics, and two are monarchies, namely
Saudi Arabia and Morocco; in both countries the king is powerful and
authoritarian.
In all countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, national parlia-
mentary elections are held. In several countries the office of president
is also elected. For example, in Iran people elect the president, who can
be impeached by Iran’s parliament. Iran’s Leader is elected by the
Assembly of Experts, who can also depose him. In the Sudan, the ruling
military dictatorship called elections in Spring 2010, ensuring
Table 3 Codification of Islamic family law in twelve countries
Country Codification: Yes/No Year
Egypt Yes 1985,2000
Morocco Yes 1958, 2004
Saudi Arabia No -
Sudan Yes 1991
Turkey - 1 -
Afghanistan Yes 1977
Iran Yes 1931, 1935, 1992, etc.2
Pakistan Yes 1961
Indonesia Yes 1974, 1975
Malaysia Yes 1984, 1994
Mali3 No -
Nigeria4 No -
1 In 1917 a Family Code was enacted, based on sharia. In 1926 it was replaced by a se-
cular Civil Code including family law, based on the Swiss Civil Code.
2 A procedural Marriage Law of 1931 is still valid. Substantive family law is codified in
the Civil Code of 1935, which was changed several times since the Islamic revolution,
namely in 1982, 1991, and in the early 2000s. The Family Protection Law of 1967
was changed in 1975, suspended in 1979. In 1992 an Amendments to Divorce regu-
lation was enacted. In 1996 a Family Courts Law was enacted. In the early 2000s 21
bills became law. In 2010 a new controversial Family Protection bill is debated.
3 In 1962 Mali enacted a secular code of family law, which was elaborated in 1975.
4 A federal Marriage Act of colonial origin is still in force, as well as a 1970 federal
Matrimonial Causes Act.
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democratic legitimacy of his regime. As in most developing countries,
political culture in the Muslim world is still marked by authoritarian-
ism, albeit in varying degrees.
Legal status of women
Of all areas of law, family and inheritance law are most influenced by
classical sharia. Turkey which has adopted a civil code based on a Swiss
model, is the exception to this rule. Sharia-based family law discrimi-
nates against women on a number of issues. However, family laws in
many Muslim countries have gradually taken distance from classical
sharia to the benefit of women; repudiation and polygamy are restricted
by procedural and substantive requirements which are laid down in leg-
islation, case law, and in (standard) marriage contracts. Such provisions
vary in their severity and effectiveness.
Repudiation (unilateral divorce by the man)
Is a man’s right, bestowed upon him by classical sharia, to repudiate
his wife at will, unilaterally, and without having to give a reason, still va-
lid? Unilateral repudiation is restricted in six of the countries, and pro-
hibited in one, Turkey. In five of the twelve countries under review the
man can still on his own authority cast off his wife, with no or hardly
any restriction (see Table 4).
Polygamy
Has the man maintained his right, as provided for by classical sharia, to
conclude multiple marriages with up to four wives, without the need
for permission of the first wife or of state authorities? In only three of
the twelve countries under review a man may freely marry a second,
Table 4 Family law: unilateral repudiation of wife by husband, in twelve countries
Not or hardly limited Several procedural
and/or substantive limits
Prohibited
Egypt x
Morocco x
Saudi Arabia x
Sudan x
Turkey x
Afghanistan x
Iran x
Pakistan x
Indonesia x
Malaysia x
Mali x
Nigeria x
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third, or fourth wife on his own authority and without any restrictions
or formalities. In other countries polygamy is legally controlled and re-
stricted by the state, usually by family courts or councils.
Divorce, initiated by women
Does a woman have the possibility to obtain a divorce from a court? In
ten of the twelve countries women can apply to the court for divorce –
whether or not the divorce is based on grounds established in her mar-
riage contract; frequently the law gives women considerable space.
Inheritance
Do female heirs inherit half of what male heirs in a similar position
would inherit? Inheritance law has distanced itself much less than mar-
riage law from classical sharia. Formally, women in most of the coun-
tries under review have indeed the right to one half of the heritage of a
man in an equal position. Some country studies, however, like Morocco
and Indonesia, refer to research suggesting widespread discontent with
such discriminatory law, and presenting evidence that in practice people
manage to find ways to leave equal shares to their daughters as to their
sons.
Cruel corporal punishments
Enactment of hadd-offences
Have national criminal laws enacted the classical sharia-based provi-
sions that prescribe heavy corporal punishments for five specific hadd-
crimes, namely extramarital sex, accusation of extramarital sex, robbery,
theft, and consumption of alcohol; and have they added, as some
schools prescribe, apostasy as a sixth hadd-offence? Of the twelve coun-
tries, there are five where these hadd-offences are partially or fully en-
acted in national law, i.e. Pakistan, Iran, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
Afghanistan (see Table 5 below). Four countries have not done so,
namely Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Mali, and the Nigerian federation.
While Indonesia, Malaysia as well as Nigeria have a long tradition of na-
tional criminal law without such provisions, they were introduced in
the 1990s by several Malaysian states, and in the 2000s by eleven
Northern Nigerian states, as well as by the remote Indonesian province
of Aceh. Concerning apostasy, see below and Table A.6 (in Annexe).
Executions of heavy corporal punishments
To which extent is it common practice to actually administer cruel cor-
poral punishments, such as stoning and amputation. According to the
country studies, at the time of writing, only Saudi Arabia is still
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executing the hadd-punishment of amputation. As Table 5 shows, in the
other countries where such punishments are legally in force, such ex-
ecutions are reportedly very rare to non-existent.
Retribution and blood money
Have national criminal laws enacted classical sharia-based provisions
that entail the retribution (qisas) of violent offences, such as murder
and assault, according to the principle of an ‘eye for an eye’, or its being
bought off with ‘blood money’ (diyya). Such provisions are not found in
seven of the twelve legal systems. In five countries, Saudi Arabia, the
Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, and North Nigeria, such provisions are in force;
the legal situation in Afghanistan is uncertain.
Table 5 Twelve times hadd-punishments in law and actual executions, in twelve
countries
Hadd-punishments in the law1 Stoning and/or Amputations carried out2
Egypt No -
Morocco No -
Saudi Arabia Yes No recent stonings, amputations continue
Sudan Yes Declined strongly
Turkey No -
Afghanistan Yes, but legality disputed No
Iran Yes Irregularly3
Pakistan Yes No
Indonesia No -
Malaysia No, except in certain states No
Mali No No
Nigeria Yes, in Northern states No stoning, amputation strongly declined
1 The penal code of Saudi Arabia is completely based on sharia, including hadd--
punishments. In the other “yes” nations the punishments can be found in the follow-
ing legislation: the Sudan, penal code of 1991, articles, 78, 26, 146, 157, 168, 171;
Afghanistan, penal code of 1976; Iran, penal code of 1996, articles 63-203; Pakistan,
hudud ordinances of 1979; Malaysia, hudud laws in two member states, Kelantan and
Terengganu; Nigeria, penal codes of eleven Northern states.
2 In some nations, whipping has taken place regularly, e.g. in Pakistan, particularly in
the early 1980s.
3 In July 2005, two boys were hanged after being convicted for homosexuality. This ex-
ecution shocked many, the more so since Iran had suspended applying corporal pun-
ishment, such as stoning and amputations, since 2002. It should be noted that hang-
ings are anyway not in line with the traditional hadd-punishments, as mentioned in
classical sharia. Since 2005, when the new conservative government under
Ahmadinejad came in, amputations and to a lesser extent stoning were carried out
again.
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Violations of human rights
This fourth area of concern is different from those mentioned above in
that here we are concerned with the extent to which international hu-
man rights standards are accepted, affect national laws, and are adhered
to in practice.
Joining international human rights treaties
Have Muslim countries actually accessed, ratified, and implemented the
major human rights treaties, and are they subjected to regular evalua-
tion and benchmarking? The country studies confirm that since the
1990s governments of Muslim countries have abandoned their pre-
viously dismissive attitude towards human rights. Becoming signatories
to international treaties and adopting human rights in national constitu-
tional law, Muslim countries have made important steps in a process of
convergence between their national laws – whether formally referring
to sharia or not – and human rights standards. Table 6 below details
the year of signature, accession, and ratification for three key human
rights treaties by each country reviewed.
Table 6 Signing, years of accession and ratification of human rights treaties in
twelve countries
ICCPR1 CEDAW2 CAT3
Signed Ratification,
Accession,
Signing year
Signed Ratification,
Accession,
Signing year
Signed Ratification,
Accession,
Signing year
Egypt Yes 1982 R Yes* 1981 R Yes 1986 A
Morocco Yes 1979 R Yes* 1993 R Yes 1993 R
SaudiArabia No - Yes* 2000 R Yes 1997 A
Sudan Yes 1986 A No - Yes 1986 s
Turkey Yes 2003 R Yes 1986 R Yes 1988 R
Afghanistan Yes 1983 A Yes 2003 R Yes 1987 R
Iran Yes 1975 R No - No -
Pakistan Yes 2008 s Yes 1996 R Yes 2008 A
Indonesia Yes 2006 A Yes 1984 R Yes 1998 R
Malaysia No - Yes* 1995 A No -
Mali Yes 1974 A Yes 1985 R Yes 1999 A
Nigeria Yes 1993 A Yes 1985 R Yes 2001 R
* Reservation(s) related to sharia
(Source: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV, last accessed
on March12, 2010)
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979)
3 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1984)
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Freedom from discrimination
To which extent do laws and practices discriminate against women in
family and inheritance law, as well as against other groups? Table A.4
(see Annexe) shows that the constitutions of eleven of the twelve coun-
tries under review embrace the principle of equality – the exception
being Saudi Arabia. Two countries, Iran and Egypt, make express reser-
vations for conformity with Islamic rules.
However, as the country studies demonstrate, a host of particular rules
in national laws and case law conflict with the constitutional guarantee
of equality, not to speak of social practices on the ground. Of the fre-
quent practices of discrimination – a hard fact of life in most countries
– a number is sanctioned by national and local sharia-based laws and
regulations. In most countries efforts to completely remove such discri-
minatory provisions run up against fierce puritan and conservative re-
sistance (see 14.5).
Freedom of religion and apostasy
Is leaving one’s faith criminalised as apostasy and punishable with hea-
vy penalties? As shown in Table A.5 (see Annexe) eleven of the twelve
constitutions guarantee freedom of religion, the exception being Saudi
Arabia. Seven out of twelve countries have not criminalised apostasy
(see Table A.6). In two countries, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan, apostasy
is a crime, and in Iran, at the time of writing, a bill of similar import is
pending (see 8.7). In Afghanistan it is unclear and disputed, while in at
least one state in Malaysia, it is punishable, though the subject is heav-
ily contested.
14.4 Comparing and ordering national legal systems
This section will attempt to classify the twelve countries’ legal systems
according to the degrees in which they have been impacted by sharia-
based law, notably of puritan orientation, by introducing a rough, three-
fold division. The first category consists of systems where sharia-based
law of a puritan orientation pervades most areas of law. Saudi Arabia
and Iran fit into this category. A second category consists of secular le-
gal systems, in which sharia has no role whatsoever. Turkey is a promi-
nent example. This leaves us with the majority of legal systems, a mid-
dle group of ‘mixed systems’ as our third category. In these legal sys-
tems sharia-based law has no overall dominance but plays a significant
role in one or more areas of the law. We will begin with Saudi Arabia
and Iran, followed by the large middle group in order of decreasing le-
vel of puritan islamisation. We will conclude with Turkey.
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Puritan orientation towards classical sharia
Saudi Arabia and Iran have, each in their own way, a strong orientation
towards classical sharia. For Saudi Arabia sharia is the basic norm,
while Iran wants to combine the two competing norms of what is called
Islamism (eslamiya) and the republicanist state (jomhuriyat) (see 8.4).
In these two countries conflicts between sharia-based law and human
rights are most prevalent and acute.
In the traditional, closed, autocratic kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under
supervision of the royal house and the powerful ulama, uncodified sha-
ria of a puritan orientation has remained the backbone of the country’s
legal system until the present day.
Saudi Arabia not only has a unique legal system, compared to
Western systems, but also compared to other Muslim countries.
The Saudi model is perhaps closest to the classical form of sha-
ri‘a adherence and application which developed after the estab-
lishment of Islam on the Arabian peninsula in the early seventh
century. […] While the revealed law has always been – and re-
mains – the general law of the land, the government also issues
important ‘regulations’. However, Islamic jurisprudence remains
the first point of reference in cases concerning personal status,
crime, civil contracts, property, etc. Judges have resorted primar-
ily to the Qur’an, the Sunna, and fiqh-books in their quest for
justice. A judge […] enjoys great discretionary power and is not
bound by doctrine of precedent. Religious scholars are also per-
mitted to give their opinions on the application of shari‘a by giv-
ing legal advice (fatwa). Fatwas are of legal importance in Saudi
Arabia and judges take them into consideration. (Van Eijk intra,
see 6.10)
The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) is led by a supreme Leader, who,
with support from other high clerics, maintains sharia in the Shiite tra-
dition. Contrary to Saudi Arabia, Iran established a tradition of parlia-
mentary elections and law-making, codification, and a centralised judi-
ciary (1906-1907). Today’s Iran is shaped by a revolutionary response to
the last Shah’s repressive regime.
Ruled by clerics, it combined not just religion and the state, but
also theocracy and democracy. The founders made two broad as-
sumptions: first, that what makes a state ‘Islamic’ is adherence
to and implementation of the sharia; secondly that, given free
choice, people will choose ‘Islam’ and will, thus, vote for clerics
as the interpreters and custodians of the sharia. When they
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framed the constitution, the founders included both theocratic
and democratic principles and institutions. The Constitution
clearly recognises the people’s right to choose who will govern
them. But some institutions, including Parliament and the pre-
sidency, though elected by direct popular vote, are nevertheless
subordinated to clerical oversight and veto. This contradiction re-
mained unresolved but unproblematic while Ayatollah
Khomeini was alive and able to mediate it […]. (Mir-Hosseini in-
tra, see 8.10)
However, ‘after over a decade of the experience of Islam in power,
Islamic dissent began to be voiced among “insiders” and became a
magnet for intellectuals whose ideas and writings now formed the back-
bone of the New Religious Thinking.’ In the 1990s they sought new di-
rections, and. […] ‘armed with Soroush’s theory of the relativity of reli-
gious knowledge, they wanted to create a worldview reconciling Islam
and modernity, and argued for a demarcation between state and reli-
gion.’ (ibid, see 8.4). Such debates among Iran’s religious scholars dis-
play a dynamism which differs considerably from the static conserva-
tism prevailing in Saudi Arabia. In recent years,
[…] the notion of sharia as an ideal enabled the reformists in
Iran to argue for democracy and the rule of law and to challenge
patriarchal and despotic laws enacted in the name of Islam.
They did so by appealing to Islam’s higher values and principles,
and by invoking concepts from within Islamic legal theory, nota-
bly the distinction between sharia as ‘divine law’ and jurispru-
dence (feqh) as the human understanding of the requirements of
the divine law. (Mir-Hosseini, intra, see 8.10)
Large middle group
Of the nine countries of the large middle group, the Sudan, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan are more oriented toward classical sharia and puritan
orientations. Yet, they belong to a category different from the first two
countries in that their basic norm combines the ‘introduction of sharia’
with more explicit and broader adherence to rule-of-law standards. In
these countries, the basic norm seems more dualist and ambiguous.
In the Sudan, many of the legal codes were replaced by Islamic codes
in 1983-1984. Because the non-Islamic South would not accept this,
war under a military dictatorship prevailed for many years. However,
the 1998 Constitution established a remarkably pluralistic basis for the
law, which was reconfirmed in the 2005 interim national constitution
(INC) following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At present ‘a
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non-Muslim could, theoretically, become president of the whole of the
Sudan (Art. 53)’ and the Sudan has a constitutional court to uphold its
moderate constitution (Köndgen intra, see 5.5).
Only a few of the INC’s articles make direct reference to Islam.
Article 1 (INC) states that the Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-eth-
nic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual state. Thus, de jure Islam
is not the state religion. (Ko¨ndgen intra, see 5.5)
Accordingly,
The INC also guarantees men and women equal rights in the
areas of civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights (Art.
32). These guarantees, however, contradict to some degree other
Sudanese legislation. Equal rights for men and women are espe-
cially relevant with regard to shari´a-based parts of the Criminal
Act (1991) and in consideration of family and inheritance laws,
which are known to be disfavourable to women in a variety of
ways. (ibid)
Pakistan was founded in 1947 as a republic for Muslims, but islamisa-
tion of the constitution and other laws had to wait until the 1970s (see
9.3-9.5). Islamic criminal law, including the law of retribution, applies
today, but family law, codified in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of
1961 was not further islamised. In both areas of law, judges in the high-
er courts have carried out an intense battle of ideas – often by use of
impressively reasoned common law arguments – to maintain a moder-
ate position. Among other things, they were able to strengthen the legal
status of women in divorce matters and to prevent severe hadd-punish-
ments; also they called the legislative ban on interest into question.
How the position and role of classical sharia will be further de-
veloped in Pakistan’s national legal system will depend largely
on the political choices to be made by the PPP, choices pertain-
ing to socio-economic development, electoral results, political
stability, relations with the West, Iran and China, and last but
not least, to the Pakistani judicial authorities. At present, faced
with the violent attacks carried out by Islamic extremists not just
in the tribal areas but in the very hearts of Pakistan’s cities, poli-
ticians seem to have lost any interest in pursuing a policy of
Islamisation. (Lau intra, see 9.10)
Afghanistan’s constitution has a dual basic norm and progressive hu-
man rights provisions. It bears the marks of years of intense
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international and national negotiations in the wake of the 2001 Bonn
Accords. Yet, the liberalisation of marriage laws has been very limited.
In criminal matters it is unclear to what degree sharia or any codified
criminal law is now in force. Customary law plays a major role in prop-
erty dealings and a considerable role in family law and criminal matters
as well. For the time being, the political and security situation hinders
the effectiveness of any legal system, whether based on sharia or an-
other source.
The result is disjointed legislation, with many gaps and unregu-
lated areas of law. Ro¨der calls the legal landscape ‘a patchwork’
of various norms (Ro¨der 2009: 257). […] a fragmented mélange
of secular, customary, and religious law variously applied accord-
ing to local acceptance of central legislation and modified by
shifting conditions of governmental authority. […]. The limited
practical value of Afghanistan’s statutory laws has to be attribu-
ted to the decline and demise of central political authority in
Afghanistan as a result of the civil war, but also to the lack of
training of legal professionals and the inability to adapt statutory
law to Afghanistan’s particular circumstances. This means for
instance that judges either do not know the law well, or know it,
but are reluctant to apply it. (Yassari and Saboory intra, 7.10)
Any reform of the legal system to bring it in line with interna-
tional human rights standards or with the provisions of the new
constitution will require as an essential prerequisite the exis-
tence of a stable, functioning, and capable state, both able and
willing to enforce laws (Lau 2003: 4). At present, this is sadly
not the situation in Afghanistan. (Yassari and Saboory intra, see
7.9)
As compared to the three abovementioned countries, the constitutions
and laws of both Egypt and Morocco seem relatively stable. Their crim-
inal laws have stuck to their European models without sharia-based pro-
visions. Similarly, their civil laws, in French fashion, have remained un-
changed, while the marriage laws in both countries have been strikingly
modernised.
Morocco’s 2004 reform of the family law codification, almost fifty
years after its first enactment, marked the end of a long and intense do-
mestic debate.
The debate on family law was waged almost entirely in Islamic
terms. Progressive groups frequently referenced the applicability
of universal human, women’s, and children’s rights and the
TOWARDS COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS 639
importance of international women’s conferences and conven-
tions, but they never dared to voice the possibility of viewing
Moroccan family law from a secular perspective. By constantly
referring to ijtihad, the modernists placed themselves within the
Islamic tradition. […] While Islamic family law has gained re-
newed meaning as a political symbol, ‘human rights’ (huquq al-
insan) as a concept has become the most important political dis-
course in present-day Moroccan society, as a means of both legit-
imising and criticising government policy. (Buskens intra, see
3.4)
In Egypt, the relation between sharia and national law is marked by
strong opposing forces. On the one hand, puritan political pressure is
exerted to stretch the meaning of Article 2 of the constitution which
states that the principles of sharia are the source of legislation. On the
other hand, we see a Supreme Constitutional Court acting as guardian
of the rule of law, and a new marriage law, which is
one of the most radical reforms also being Egypt’s first law of
the twenty-first century. Article 20 of Law 1/2000 effectively pro-
vides for the right of women to unilaterally divorce their hus-
bands through a court procedure called khul‘ (Sonneveld 2009;
see also 2.6). This is exceptional for two reasons. Firstly, while
the law was presented as a law of procedure, it, in actual fact,
contains rules of substantive law. Secondly, although the article
on khul‘ was presented as being in accordance with the sharia, it
is not part of the corpus of any of the four Sunni schools of jur-
isprudence. […] This law therefore brought about an expansion
of the authority of the legislature with regard to interpretation of
the sharia. (Berger and Sonneveld intra, see 2.4)
Two other countries of the ‘large middle group’, namely Nigeria and
Malaysia, are federations with large non-Muslim population segments,
which enacted rather progressive constitutions that ascribe only a lim-
ited place to Islamic law. Both countries have a strong common law tra-
dition. Sharia plays an important role in matters of family law. In both
countries leading politicians at sub-national state level promised to in-
troduce sharia-based criminal legislation at the time of elections, won,
and kept their promise. In Nigeria, this process happened on a much
larger scale and more systematically than in Malaysia. In both countries
the jurisdiction of sharia courts was extended at the cost of general
courts.
In Malaysia, according to Harding, between the sharia courts and the
civil courts there ‘have been and continue to be significant skirmishes
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at the borders, which are expressed principally in terms of legal strug-
gles over territory or ‘jurisdiction’ (see 14.10). There is, for example, a
difference of opinion in the federal courts over the question as to
whether the states have the power to introduce sharia criminal law, and
execute punishments. In Harding’s view:
The success of the legal cultures of Southeast Asia over hun-
dreds of years in absorbing and melding various legal worlds
and concepts indicates that a syncretic, creative, and peaceful so-
lution to the problem of Islam and constitutionalism is by no
means impossible. At present it seems as though such an ideal
solution is fraught with both political controversy and intellec-
tual confusion. (Harding intra, see 14.10)
However, the very fact that these conflicts are debated, and often even-
tually decided, in the courtroom makes the author conclude that the
mechanisms of the common law are capable of structuring and moder-
ating the fundamental conflicts between sharia and the rule of law
(ibid.).
In 2000 and 2001 eleven states in Northern Nigeria went so far as to
implement Islamic criminal law and entrust its application to Islamic
law courts. While this is a major legal shift, it should be noted that the
judiciary still has allowed no stonings, and since 2002 no more ampu-
tations. The federal government has decided to allow islamisation for as
long as, in its judgment, the constitution is not actually violated.
Governor Sani [of the northern state of Zamfara, JMO] ’s an-
nouncement of his sharia implementation programme exhila-
rated Nigeria’s Muslims, and produced tremendous pressure on
the governments of other northern states to follow suit. But it
aroused fear and loathing among Christians, who expected the
worst; civil war was even predicted by some [...] Everyone’s worst
fears seemed to be confirmed by the first amputation of a hand
for theft already in March 2000, and then by the stoning cases
of Safiyatu Hussaini (2001-2002) and Amina Lawal (2002-
2003), which caused an uproar around the world. Since those
early days, however, the clamour has died down completely, to
the point that sharia implementation was a non-issue, virtually
never mentioned, in the state and federal election campaigns of
2007. (Ostien intra, see 13.4)
The legal systems of the two remaining countries of the large middle
group, Indonesia and Mali, are more secularly oriented. The word
Islam does not appear in Indonesia’s constitution, while Mali’s
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constitution states that it is a secular republic. Both systems, founded
on a colonial heritage of continental law, Dutch and French respectively,
allow only limited space to sharia, mainly in family and inheritance law.
Indonesia has a codified Marriage Law (1/1974), which assigns con-
siderable powers to the state Religious Courts to decide about cases of
divorce and polygamy. The 1991 Compilation of Islamic Law is to back
up the work of the Religious Courts with an Indonesian restatement of
fiqh-rules. In 2006 a similar compilation was issued for the area of eco-
nomic law. While until 1998 Indonesia’s ruling elites, whether colonial
or postcolonial, tried to control, bureaucratise and direct people’s reli-
gious orientations,
Indonesia is presently conducting a unique experiment with de-
mocratic law-making in the context of cultural islamisation. In
this process, it has been responding both to Islamist pressure
and the call to respect human rights. (Otto intra, see 10.10)
This experiment has led to many local and provincial regulations aim-
ing at the promotion of Islamic virtue and the prevention of vice.
Remarkably, the promotion of sharia-based legislation, both in
Aceh as well as in other provinces and districts, has largely been
driven by non-Islamist parties such as Golkar and PDI (Bush
2008). Similarly, Aceh’s turn to the sharia […] did not unequivo-
cally express the strong demand of all Acehnese. On the con-
trary, when after the Peace Agreement the Free Aceh Movement
had turned into a regular political party, and this newly formed
Partai Aceh won the 2009 elections, they opposed the radical
turn to sharia-based law. (ibid.)
In Mali, ‘Sharia did not play a role in the formation or adaptation of
Malian law’ as ‘[I]slamic law has never been strongly represented or in-
stitutionalised in any colonial or postcolonial state law.’ (see 12.3, 12.10).
One reason why the growing political weight of influential
Muslims did not translate into an islamisation of the legal insti-
tutional framework is certainly the coterminous, growing influ-
ence of Western donor organisations to which Moussa Traore´
turned increasingly throughout the 1980s in search for financial
support. (Schultz intra, see 12.4)
The way in which people equate their local customs with sharia also
needs to be taken into consideration.
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It must be noted that at the grassroots level polygamy and other
conventions in the sphere of marriage and family relations were
never regarded as specifically Islamic practices. In most rural
and urban zones of contemporary Mali, physical punishment,
repudiation, and other practices reaffirming women’s inferior
status position and rights vis-à-vis elders and men are commonly
accepted. These actions are occasionally attenuated by the inter-
vention of mediators and kin. But the actions are nevertheless
acknowledged as accepted custom. (Schultz intra, see 12.6)
Efforts to pass a new bill on family law have been frustrated for many
years, due to the conflicting views of puritans and moderates, and of
Western and Islamic donors.
Secular system
In Turkey sharia is completely removed from the national legal system.
Secularism or kemalism is constitutionally anchored, and a constitu-
tional court watches out for any violations. An Office for Religious
Affairs supervises religion and education. The first three articles of the
constitution (1982) formulate ‘fundamental principles described as ‘im-
mutable provisions’ in Article 4’. They stipulate that
Turkey is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with a wide
range of human rights […] Articles 1, 2, and 3 […] outline the
constituent characteristics of the system which include it being
a democratic, laic, constitutional state that respects human
rights.[…] The republic remains loyal to Atatu¨rk’s nationalism
and the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble, which
states that ‘as required by the principle of laicism, there shall be
no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state
affairs and politics […]. (Koc¸ak intra, see 6.5)
The secular legal system, however, is often tested by individuals, groups
and political parties demanding more space to profess their Islamic reli-
gion, for example by wearing a headscarf. The judiciary and the army’s
general staff remain on guard to protect the state against what they see
as a direct threat.
As this section has shown, the differences between countries in how
they have incorporated sharia in their national legal systems – or not –
are considerable. In view of such overwhelming diversity an essentialist
approach seems beside the point. The future modalities of incorpora-
tion of sharia do not primarily depend on puritan rage, or on
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transnational human rights activism. The leading part is played by na-
tional office-bearers – politicians, law-makers, judges and bureaucrats –
who, interacting with civil society amidst opposing and complex ideolo-
gical forces, will continue to struggle, negotiate, and decide about the
guiding principles and rules of incorporation.
14.5 Governance
Policy re sharia and contemporary challenges of governance
It may be the case that this book has created the impression that pro-
blems of sharia-based law appear as priority issues on cabinets’ agendas
throughout the Muslim world all the time. In reality, far more fre-
quently discussed are issues of security and stability, economic growth,
public finance, poverty reduction, education, public health, housing, de-
centralisation, elections, and foreign relations. No different than any-
where else, Muslim governments aim for the three goals of stability,
prosperity, and social justice. Governance efforts to reach these goals re-
quire a degree of democracy, sound administration, and an effective le-
gal system, whether derived from fiqh-sources or not.
Perhaps in Saudi Arabia and Iran sharia is so central to all policy con-
cerns that political decision-making immediately touches upon issues
of sharia-based law. In most Muslim countries, however, political debate
about sharia and national law is often just simmering in the back-
ground, only to flare up when attention is called to specific events and
issues. High profile cases of ‘Islamic crimes’, a new marriage bill, puri-
tan violence, skirmishes about judicial competences, inter-religious con-
flict, are all of great political sensitivity.
Governance in such areas comes down exactly to how Hyden et al.
define it, namely as “the formation and stewardship of the formal and
informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state
as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions”
(Hyden et al. 2004: 16). Governance decisions, as Hyden et al. elabo-
rate, are made in six different arenas of governance, i.e. government, ci-
vil society, political society, bureaucracy, economic society, and the judi-
ciary (ibid: 18-22). The country studies in this book have explored many
of these arenas, and show that the Muslim state has taken many differ-
ent shapes: just caliphate, despotic sultanate, colonial empire state, in-
dependent state, authoritarian state, socialist state, developmental state,
sharia state, democratic state, aid state, corrupt state, failing state, rule-
of-law state.
In section 14.2 we concluded that during the first decades after
World War II most developing countries suffered from several serious
governance failures. In response, a ‘new governance’ emerged in the
developing world during the last few decades. Therefore, contemporary
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policy discussions on incorporation of sharia take place in a governance
context which has changed. First, market forces have been released and
created in many countries an entrepreneurial middle class with a vested
interest in the rule of law. Furthermore, democratisation and elections
have changed political landscapes significantly. Demands for respect of
individual human rights cannot be neglected by governments without
strong criticism. Corrupt behavior is openly discussed, yet still omnipre-
sent. Domestic and international programmes to strengthen judiciaries
in order to promote the rule of law are in full swing (Carothers 2006).
And, finally, religion, notably Islam, has returned to the center stage.
No doubt, this new governance cannot be a cure for all policy problems,
but it certainly shows a learning curve.
As for the relationship between sharia and national law, the experi-
ments with puritan governance in Iran, the Sudan, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and North Nigeria have provided an opportunity to experi-
ence the ‘introduction of the sharia’ in contemporary states. The chap-
ters by Mir-Hosseini, Lau, and Köndgen, describing Iran, Pakistan, and
Sudan – the forerunners in this process – strongly suggest that the era
of revolutionary Islamic law reform is past its peak. Ostien’s chapter
emphasises that for Nigeria the learning experience of islamisation is
essentially a good thing, and that within a decade since its inception,
the introduction of sharia has already become a non-issue. Yet, there is
no reason to expect that political pressure to incorporate sharia in na-
tional law will altogether wither away.
Governments, puritans and scholars: clashes and compromises3
In every country study in this book, sooner or later the puritans pop up;
for example, the Mahdi in nineteenth century Sudan, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, the mullahs who deposed king Amanullah of
Afghanistan, Khomeini and his Ayatollahs, the Saudi rebels occupying
the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the MMA-coalition in Pakistan, and the
PAS party in Malaysia. No region, no era in Islamic history escapes
completely the presence of the puritans.
Time and again they display the same features, these men – and wo-
men – of ideals, imagining a better society and government. Quite a
few are individual models of selflessness, devoted to ‘the cause’ and to
providing social services. Both characteristics are rare in developing so-
cieties, where most people struggle to make ends meet. In doing so
they act as catalysts of popular discontent. A minor segment is militant,
and ready to die as martyrs. All of this is part of their appearance as
true and pious Muslims.
Most governments fear puritans. Puritan groups are often well-orga-
nised, have large numbers of active followers and transnational
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networks, their own media, and (inter)national financiers. They also are
among the few organised movements who speak about the real and ser-
ious problems that disrupt society in most of these countries: poverty,
lack of security, education, and health; invasion of the government into
everyday life; and corruption, urbanisation problems, social and cultural
changes, partly under foreign influences (Halliday 2003: 118). Although
many of them are young students, one can find senior members in reli-
gious institutions, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the army, and the busi-
ness sector. While puritans are often capable of infiltrating those insti-
tutions, state intelligence units are often able to detect and arrest them.
In the struggle to change the existing relationship between sharia
and national law, puritan movements deploy their activists along a num-
ber frontlines, which largely coincide with the main concerns and is-
sues discussed in previous sections (see 14.3).
Another important party in this struggle is the religious establish-
ment of scholars. Many scholars have an ambivalent relationship with
the puritan movements: they feel criticised by them, and they see them
as unskilled in fiqh and overzealous. But, at the same time, they see
them as the front soldiers, who could pave the way to an Islamic state
in which they, the scholars, will finally play a leading role again. In spite
of their marginalisation from the national legal system, scholars retain
important functions. They are senior staff at the ministries of religion.
They sit on local, regional and national bodies as the official representa-
tives of religion, and issue fatwas about many different subjects, from
Islamic banking to euthanasia. As judges in family courts, many of
them have earned a reputation of fairness and ability to find reasonable
solutions for problematic cases. As preachers, they lead the Friday
prayer and are called to attend to the important ‘rites de passage’ –
birth, marriage, divorce, death – and to act as people’s moral compass
in the problems of daily life. Some of them do this also on radio, TV, or
the Internet. In addition, they oversee educational institutions, the man-
agement of waqf-land, the annual pilgrimage, and the collection of
Islamic alms (zakat). On all issues discussed in section 14.3, scholars
take positions based on their interpretation of the fiqh. Most govern-
ments hope that such positions will support state policies and laws, as
the scholars’ religious blessing is most welcome to enhance the state’s
legitimacy.
Besides puritans and religious scholars, the ideological spectrum of
Muslim countries is beset with feminist movements, human rights
groups, and explicitly liberal Muslim groups. While deciding upon sha-
ria-related issues, governments have to consider the – often conflicting –
demands of the conservative ulama, the puritans, the modernists, the
religious minorities, the feminists, and so on. Inevitably, they will in-
voke disappointment and anger from one party or the other. In order to
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take the wind out of the puritans’ sails, to appease the clergy, and to re-
concile the various goals of development and good governance, clever
compromises are needed. The country studies in this book testify to the
impressive balancing capacities of law-makers, administrators and
judges, using the dual basic norm and legal ambiguity to the best of
their knowledge.
The complex relationship between sharia and custom
Meanwhile, governments in developing Muslim countries also have to
deal with communities, clans, and tribes which make up much of the
social structure of their countries. Alongside the rise of Islam, sharia
brought a series of religious, social and legal reforms to a patriarchal
and often brutal society, where Arab tribal customs constituted the pre-
vailing law. In spreading their religion, Muslims set out to replace local
traditions with sharia as the prime normative system. However, custom-
ary norms were not simply washed away, being deeply rooted and clo-
sely connected with kinship, power, and economy. In certain areas con-
sensus emerged by mutual acceptation and adaptation. As the scholars
developed sharia, they took local norms into account. Islamic jurispru-
dence recognises custom (orf). Leaders of clans, tribes and local com-
munities converted to Islam and added sharia to the repertoire of
norms they applied. In other areas, tensions grew between such leaders,
their customs and old-established authority structures on the one hand,
and the Islamic authorities with their firm beliefs, their message of re-
form, and their more uniform and elaborated justice system on the
other hand. Both harmony and conflict between sharia and custom are
played out throughout this book.
Puritans especially tend to hold local custom and local culture in low
esteem. They disapprove of pre-Islamic norms, they denounce casual
dress, close companionship between unmarried women and men, they
dislike the widespread respect for Sufism, for saintly figures, for music
and dancing, branding it all as un-Islamic. Their zealous promotion of
puritan ideas, however, has yielded not only political successes, but also
a variety of counter-movements. In a book entitled ‘The Illusion of the
Islamic State’ (Ilusi Negara Islam) the late former president of
Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid, strongly condemns the infiltration of
Saudi-funded transnational puritan movements in Indonesia, accusing
them of ‘cultural genocide’ (Wahid 2009: backcover).
In contrast, there is also evidence from countries in both Africa and
Asia that there is a strong demand for sharia as a substitute for arbi-
trary and repressive tribal justice. In fact this is a historical role of shar-
ia. As Yassari explains ‘the status of Afghan women under customary
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law is worse than the status afforded to them under the most conserva-
tive interpretation of Islamic law’ (see 7.10). Ostien suggests that acti-
vists who seek to improve the legal status of women in Nigeria take re-
course to sharia for the same reasons:
That Islamic personal law as applied in northern Nigeria is still
often contaminated by local custom antithetical to women is
confirmed by the work of the Federation of Muslim Women
Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN), founded in 1985 (Yusuf
1993), and more recently by the attitude taken toward sharia im-
plementation by Muslim women activists (see 13.6).
Ostien’s findings confirm the recent findings of Stiles (2009) about
Tanzanian Muslim women who discovered that Islamic justice provides
them with individual rights (hakki), opening the desired road to free-
dom from a tribal life without rights. Today, amidst much understand-
able criticism of sharia, it is often forgotten that the only alternative
which is available in many places, is unfortunately not an effective and
fair state justice system, but rather a semi-functional customary system.
Often it is difficult to entangle the religious from the customary.
Does sharia justify customs such as female circumcision, or honour
killings, or are these local traditions, which the sharia disapproves of?
In spite of authoritative fatwas denying the Islamic nature of such cus-
toms, for example the one on circumcision issued by Egypt’s supreme
religious authority, the Sheykh al-Azhar (see 2.9), such practices con-
tinue. At grassroots level, people often do not know nor mind the pre-
cise normative foundation of their behaviour, as long as it is part of
‘our tradition’.
Similarly, it is sometimes difficult for outsiders, including Western
journalists, to distinguish Islamic court rulings from primitive mob-jus-
tice or repulsive misuse of authority by local policemen or other offi-
cials. If primitive clan members kill a woman accused of extramarital
sex by stoning her, as has happened repeatedly in Pakistan – in flagrant
violation of sharia’s basic procedural and evidence rules – Western
media are often quick to link it to what they call ‘Islamic law’.
Since tribal and community leaders are real power holders in many
areas of the Muslim world, they often are instrumental for national poli-
tical stability. In their communities they are ‘big men’, who solve pro-
blems and settle conflicts by applying traditional or indigenous law.
They manage the relations between the local and the national, acting as
intermediaries between the police, the army, business, and as vote-bro-
kers in elections. In times of trouble they can become small or big war-
lords, turning their clan members into fighters. Governments, for the
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sake of stability, must therefore also keep the tribal leaders satisfied,
and be careful not to disregard their wishes and ‘their traditions’.
Attitudes of the West
Our country studies confirm that the relationship between sharia and
national law is highly dependent on domestic politics. Transnational re-
lations within the Muslim world is another important factor. In addi-
tion, the West remains involved in this matter, as certain sharia policies
are in part motivated by a rejection of the West and others by appease-
ment. At the time of writing, two decades of extreme Western hubris
that started with the fall of the Berlin wall, seem to be coming to an
end. The Western banking system has undergone an unprecedented fi-
nancial crisis. China, India and other economies have emerged success-
fully; Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia
have joined the G-20. Regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan, as con-
ceived by the West, has been far more difficult than expected. Western
foreign policy regarding the Muslim world also seems unable to solve
the democratisation dilemma: on the one hand, the West pushes for
free elections; on the other hand, it is not always ready to accept the
outcome.
A more productive attitude regarding problems in the Muslim world
will require refreshing the knowledge base, and adapting positions. An
important lesson from the country studies is that, as Buskens puts it,
the far-reaching debates on family law are waged almost entirely in
Islamic terms. Even progressive groups do not dare to present their
views from a secular perspective. By constantly referring to ijtihad they
place themselves within the Islamic tradition. Meanwhile ‘human
rights’ (huquq al-insan) as a concept has become a very important politi-
cal discourse, as a means of both legitimising and criticising govern-
ment policy (cf. 3.4).
Some authors, such as Lau on Pakistan, state that politicians in the
Muslim world have lost interest in pursuing a policy of islamisation,
due to the violent attacks, for which Islamists claimed responsibility.
Perhaps the effect of those attacks on domestic policy is greater than
most human rights interventions by the West; this would count in fa-
vour of Western foreign policies of restraint. Reading through the coun-
try studies in this book, one cannot but agree with Zakaria (2003: 155),
who comes down on the side of caution in the democratisation dilem-
ma, and turns against rapid and large-scale democratisation as was ad-
vocated by the Bush administration. In this connection he warns
against ‘ugly ethnic forces’ and argues for ‘a longer period of state-
building.’ He feels that in certain situations elections can be held only
after ‘civic institutions, courts, political parties, and the economy have
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all begun to function. As with everything in life: timing matters.’ He ad-
vocates ‘a certain sophistication’ in this regard, warning that ‘[t]he haste
to pressure countries into elections […] has been, in many cases,
counterproductive.’
In any case, the international quest for justice in the Muslim world
deserves to be pursued with political sophistication, and a solid knowl-
edge base (Carothers 2006). If human rights are to be ‘everyone’s
right’, they should not be in conflict with the beliefs of 1.5 billion people
(Brems 2001). In the international monitoring procedures to oversee
the implementation of human right treaties there should be some re-
cognition for the difficult dilemmas faced by governments of Muslim
countries who often cannot but respond to the fact that the majority of
their citizens do hold sharia in a positive light.
Perhaps the West could provide useful technical and financial assis-
tance for the strengthening of human rights protection systems. For,
the ‘supply side’ of justice systems, i.e. the quality of legal process, re-
quires much investment and leadership. Whereas legal institution-
building is in the first place a domestic affair, international legal coop-
eration, with professional assistance from other Muslim countries as
well as from Western countries, can probably be of help, if carried out
well.
The long and winding road to justice
While ‘good’ governance can mean different things to different people,
there is consensus that rules and governance are good when they con-
tribute to stability, prosperity and justice. ‘Justice’ is the keyword in
Western treatises about the rule of law and human rights. Justice (‘adl)
is also the core concept in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). This book de-
monstrates that under certain conditions both concepts of justice do ac-
tually coincide in the established practice of moderate interpretation of
sharia, which is manifest in laws, rulings and legal practices in Muslim
countries, as well as in religious discourse (see 1.5).
Moderate practice has a long tradition in Islam. Akbar, a Mughal em-
peror in India (1591) who was leading a vast Muslim empire in an age
when in Europe the ‘Inquisitions were in full swing’, promoted free-
dom of religion and ‘insisted that we should be free to examine whether
reason does or does not support any existing custom, or provides justifi-
cation for ongoing policy’. This Muslim emperor figures in Amartya
Sen’s The Idea of Justice also as a fierce proponent of the freedom of re-
ligion (Sen 2009: 36-39). Recent studies of sharia by Abou el-Fadl
(2005), Ardjomand (2008), Feldman (2008), and Hallaq (2009) all
highlight the old ‘Islamic constitutional state’ and the ‘Circle of Justice’,
providing many historical examples of what contemporary Western
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lawyers would call ‘legality’, ‘due process’, and, indeed, ‘justice’. Islamic
legal history is more than what puritans often suggest it is. As Hallaq
demonstrates in his 2009 work, the historical archives of sharia and ru-
ler’s law contain many treasures to be discovered and valued as the
building bricks of a strong moderate tradition.
In the long term the processes of state formation and socio-economic
change will probably contribute to the convergence of sharia and the
rule of law. Essentially, for legal development there is no main route
other than through the state, its laws, its legal processes and institu-
tions. Meanwhile, the emancipation of women, the democratisation of
politics, and the increase in respect for human rights are developments
that cannot be denied or halted. After nationalisation and adaptation of
sharia, we are now witnessing its democratisation and constitutionalisa-
tion. Sharia-based laws, therefore, are increasingly adapted – by legisla-
tures and courts – and applied in accordance with the prevailing sense
of justice, as our country studies demonstrate.
This puts huge responsibilities on the legal institutions that have
been established for these purposes. The country studies in this book
suggest that most legislatures, bureaucracies and courts in the Muslim
world have made considerable progress in a few decades time. Harding,
referring to Malaysia, argues that modern legal institutions are, in prin-
ciple, able to bring ‘the problem of Islam and constitutionalism’ to a
peaceful solution, even though their work is complicated by political
controversies and intellectual confusion. In countries such as Turkey,
Pakistan, and Egypt, fairly independent courts play key roles in accom-
modating or even solving fundamental conflict. The very fact that these
conflicts are dealt with in a legal procedural manner, is a clear sign of
hope that, as Harding puts it, the mechanisms of modern law are cap-
able of structuring and moderating many of the fundamental conflicts
between sharia and the rule of law (see 14.10). Generally speaking,
though, the state of legal institutions in the developing world is far
from ideal, and much remains to be done, but at least they are there,
and channel conflicts.
While professional jurists operate from the end of national law, much
work lays also ahead at the other end, i.e. for religious scholars to make
constructive use of the intellectual heritage of the fiqh. Mir-Hosseini
shows how in Iran ulama have taken the lead in intense discussions
about ways to make interpretations compatible with contemporary as-
pirations, notably with human rights. Scholars therefore are increas-
ingly trained in the new methodologies, as Hallaq discusses in the last
chapter of his latest book. Egypt’s Ashmawi, Syria’s Shahrur, Kuwait’s
Abou el-Fadl, Pakistan’s Fazlur Rahman, Iran’s Soroush, Indonesia’s
Hazairin, were raised and studied in different Muslim countries, but
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they all share a strong desire to reconcile sharia with modernity (Hallaq
2009: 500-542).
Puritans will remain a social and political force to reckon with. In re-
cent decades they have been associated with radicalism and violence,
without any credible and feasible perspective on justice for all (Fuller
2003). Perhaps their recent recourse to human rights and democracy
will open up more constructive and successful routes. In any case, they
will keep reminding the world that sharia remains a cornerstone of
Islam. And as long as the state’s legal systems keep suffering from ser-
ious shortcomings, many people will feel a strong desire for better gov-
ernance, for a better system of law. In such circumstances, God’s law,
the sharia, will remain an obvious reference for legal development, or
at least, a source of moral and political inspiration, as has been pro-
posed by An-Na’im in his visionary Islam and the Secular State (2009).
Vikør, in conclusion of his historical analysis of sharia, sees in most
Muslim countries
‘both a dichotomy between ‘state law’ and an independent
‘Sharı¯’a’ and – as under the medieval siya¯sa – a merger of them
through the incorporation of Sharı¯’a-based rules into the codi-
fied laws of the state.’ (Vikør 2005: 346-347).
It is this incorporation, this merger, which has been the main theme of
this book. If the collaborative efforts of all contributors have provided
the reader with a realistic and balanced overview and a deeper insight
into the relationship between sharia and national law, our main objec-
tive has been achieved. Hopefully, this book will also serve as a useful
foundation for further comparative research, moving into three direc-
tions, as to include analyses of landmark decisions by the courts, of
field studies on local sharia-related practices, and, finally, initiate addi-
tional socio-legal studies of the sharia-based laws of other Muslim
countries.
Notes
1 As we learned from the country studies, the terms ‘Islamic court’, ‘sharia-court’ or
‘religious court’ are labels which in themselves contain little relevant information,
not any more than ‘national court’ or ‘general court’ for that matter. Some ‘Islamic’
or ‘religious courts’, like in Indonesia, are actually state courts, subordinate to a su-
preme court of a basically secular set-up. Elsewhere, for example in Saudi Arabia or
Iran, courts are not given such label, but the law they apply and their legal interpreta-
tions are clearly based on fiqh.
2 The next phase of this research project will address developments in the case law of
religious courts. Based on the country studies so far, our overall hypothesis is that
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higher courts tend towards more moderate interpretations as compared to the some-
times strict interpretations in the rulings of lower courts.
3 See for an analysis of ‘the clash within the Islamic civilisation’, Trautner (1999).
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